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NOTES
Inchoate Dower Today
"It is difficult to state exactly the nature or qualities of an inchoate
dower interest. Vagueness of expression attends all discussions." '
Through the centuries writers have repeatedly attempted to formulate
some definition, 2 but without attaining any degree of harmony. For ex-
ample, it has sometimes been maintained that the wife has a subsisting
interest or estate in land,3 while it has also been postulated that the
wife's inchoate right is a contingent possibility which is neither an estate
nor a right of action.4 A large measure of protection has been afforded
by the courts, and having reached their conclusion, they have ittle
difficulty now in looking to the past and selecting from the abundant
supply of definitions one which is appropriate to their conclusion. The
language of the courts, standing alone, affords little explanation except
when considered in the light of the particular case.5 In order to ascertain
just what rights the wife of a living husband has in his property, one must,
per force, turn to the cases. Starting only with the basic premises that
an inchoate dower right is the interest which the wife has in her hus-
band's land during his life and which may become a right of dower con-
summate on his death,6 and that this interest arises by operation of law
rather than by virtue of the marriage contract, 7 this paper is devoted
to a study of the treatment which the inchoate interest has received
judicially, with and without the interference of legislation.8
ALIENABILITY
Right of the wife: Classically, since the right is merely one in action,
not in possession, a wife may not assign, convey, or mortgage it, although
by her own act she may release or extinguish it.9 The release of the
right of dower prior to marriage was not recognized at common law be-
cause it was believed that no right could be barred before it accrued.' 0
1. See Johnson v. Vandyke, 6 Mclean 422, 440 (U. S. Cir. 1855).
2. See Kagan, The Nature of Dowry in Roman Law-Rights of Husband and
Wife, 20 TuLA-E L. REv. 557 (1946) and Rabinowitz, The Origin of the Common-
Law Warranty of Real Property and of the Inchoate Rights of Dower, 30 CORN. L. Q.
77 (1945) for the alleged origin of the inchoate right of dower in Hebrew and Roman
law, respectively. It was first recognized officially in Chapter 7 of the Magna Carta
of 1217, see McKEcHNiE, MAGNA CARTA 216 (2d ed. 1914).
3. Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298 (1873).
4. Turner v. Turner, 185 Va. 505, 39 S. E. 2d 299 (1946) ; Klein v. Mangan, 369
Ill. 645, 17 N. E. 2d 958 (1939).
5. As in other fields of the law, fraud is not tolerated by the courts, and any at-
tempt by the husband to perpetrate same on the wife will be sufficient grounds for the
protection of her inchoate dower interest. Thus, any mention of fraud has been omit-
ted hereafter in this paper.
6. American Blower Co. v. MacKenzie, 197 N. C. 152, 147 S. E. 829 (1929).
7. In re Cropsey Ave., 244 App. Div. 188, 278 N. Y. 815 (2d Dep't 1935), rev'd,
268 N. Y. 183, 197 N. E. 189 (1935).
8. Statutory modifications receive specific treatment throughout this Note.
9. LeCroy v. Cook, 204 S. W. 2d 173 (Ark. 1947) ; Patterson v. Durand Farmers'
Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 303 Ill. App. 128, 24 N. E. 2d 740 (1940) ; Davenport v. Gwil-
liams, 133 Ind. 142, 31 N. E. 790 (1892) ; Witthaus'v. Schack, 105 N. Y. 332, 11 N. E.
649 (1887).
10. Blackmon v. Blackmon, 16 Ala. 633 (1849). Contra: Culberson v. Culberson,
37 Ga. 296 (1867) ; 2 ScRISNER, LAw oF DOWER 371-401 (1867).
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The general rule in equity, however, is that a reasonable bona fide agree-
ment made before marriage by a woman competent to contract whereby
she accepts a reasonable provision in lieu of dower is a valid and en-
forceable jointure.-' Today, statutes affecting jointure are not uncom-
mon.'2  Since a married woman was under a contractual incapacity at
common law, she could not contract with her husband to release her
dower.1 3  Statutes have also varied this rule in many jurisdictions.' 4  In
the absence of a statute, equity will enforce the agreement between the
husband and wife where the wife accepted consideration in lieu of dower.'5
Married Women's Acts have been held to give the wife the power to bar
her dower by a post-nuptial agreement provided the husband acts in good
faith, the agreement is clear, and he gives adequate consideration.' 6
Probably a majority of jurisdictions hold to the contrary unless the
statute contains express language concerning the right of dower.' 7 Dower
may generally be released in a separation agreement.' 8 At common law
a married woman could extinguish her interest only by joinder with her
husband in a "fine" or "common recovery." ' 9 Today it is virtually
universal that, by statute, a wife may join her husband in the execution
of a deed or mortgage for the purpose of releasing her interest in the
property conveyed.2 0 The formalities which must be observed in the re-
lease are strikingly similar to the requirements of executing a deed. Mere
assent to the deed is not sufficient; the wife must sign and seal the in-
strument and indicate her purpose in releasing her dower.2 ' Dower can-
not be released to a person having no interest in the property at the
time, since this would, in effect, be an attempted conveyance of the in-
11. Matter of Phillips, 293 N. Y. 483, 58 N. E. 2d 504 (1944) ; McCready's Estate,
316 Pa. 246, 175 Atl. 554 (1934). But see Shaw v. Boyd, 5 S. & R. 309, 312 (Pa.
1819) (infant's contract of jointure is voidable).
12. 2 ME. REV. STAT., c. 153, § 42 (1944) ; Smith v. Farrington, 139 Me. 241, 29
A. 2d 163 (1942) (statute is not exclusive, and a fair oral contract supported by a
memorandum is valid) ; N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 190, 197, 198; In re Young, 92 N.
Y. 235 (1883). But cf. Graham v. Graham, 67 Hun 329, 22 N. Y. Supp. 299 (1893),
aff'd, 143 N. Y. 573, 38 N. E. 722 (1894). Other states having statutes allowing the
release of inchoate dower rights by jointure are: Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina (subject to certain
requirements), South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
13. Kreiser's Appeal, 69 Pa. 194 (1871) ; see Hill v. Boland, 125 Md. 113, 116, 93
Atl. 395, 396 (1915) (but such an agreement is sustained by applying the doctrine of
estoppel).
14. Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland.
15. In re Leggett's Estate, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 921 (Surr. Ct. 1941) ; Inskipt's Estate,
324 Pa. 406, 188 Atl. 127 (1936) ; Dakin v. Dakin, 97 Mich. 284, 56 N. W. 562 (1893).
16. Ky. REv. STAT. § 392.120 (1946), Johnson's Adm'r v. Johnson, 231 Ky. 740, 22
S. W. 2d 124 (1929).
17. ME. REv. STAT., c. 156, §§ 10, 12 (1944), Pinkham v. Pinkham, 95 Me. 71, 49
Atl. 48 (1901).
18. Fischer v. Leach, 124 Kan. 97, 258 Pac. 295 (1927), cert. denied, 276 U. S. 618
(1928). Contra: Stilson v. Stilson, 46 Conn. 15 (1878) (void as against public pol-
icy). For discussion of suicide as a bar to dower, see Shea, In Bar of Dower: Hom-
cide, 14 FLA. L. J. 19 (1940).
19. See Flanagan v. Flanagan, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 267, 271 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
20. Hams v. Marshall, 43 F. 2d 703 (C. C. A. 2d 1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S.
882 (1930); DuPont v. Wilmington Trust Co., 45 A. 2d 510 (Del. Ch. 1946) (the
wife may release the inchoate right of dower in her husband's realty to a purchaser
for consideration) ; Witman v. Webner, 351 Pa. 503, 41 A. 2d 686 (1945) (wife may
release dower by joining husband in conveyance to trustee in trust for both spouses
during their lives, wife obtaining a life interest in the entire property).
21. Lothrop v. Foster, 51 Me. 367 (1863) ; Lufkin v. Curtis, 13 Mass. 222 (1816).
But cf. Hackney v. Smith, 209 Ky. 806, 273 S. W. 476 (1925) (failure of deed to
include wife's name in caption, or granting or habendum clause..was not fatal). New
York and South Carolina statutes require that the wife's release must be acknowledged.
choate dower right.2 2  But in some jurisdictions the wife may, subsequent
to her husband's sole alienation, release her dower to any person who
becomes the owner of the property which is subject to her right of
dower.2 3  A release to a subsequent grantee who has reconveyed with-
out covenants of warranty is, however, void.24  Since the dower interest
is not assignable while inchoate, the person to whom the right is released
cannot assert it while the husband is alive.2 5 Where the wife relinquishes
her dower interest by joining with her husband in the conveyance, some
courts hold that such relinquishment terminates the dower right once and
for all; 20 other courts say that the relinquishment is effective by way
of estoppel for the benefit of only the person to whom made, or his
privies.27 It should be noted at this point that the joinder of the wife
merely to release her dower interest does not estop her from asserting a
prior or after acquired title as against the transferee .
2
Specific performance of husband's executory contract to sell: The
necessity for a wife to join with her husband in a conveyance of land
is well settled. But where she fails to join and the third party attempts
to compel specific performance of the husband's agreement of sale, courts
are apparently in accord that some manner of protection should be
afforded the inchoate dower right.2 9 The decisions can be divided into
three groups. The first group of cases may be classified under the rule
that the vendee may demand specific performance of the husband's in-
terest if he is satisfied to take the husband's title thus encumbered
30
without abatement in the purchase price for the interest of the wife.
31
The second view, probably the majority, allows specific performance
with deduction from the purchase price of the estimated value of the wife's
interest.3 2  A third classification is made by those courts which allow
specific performance, but require the vendee either to pay the value of
22. In re Leggett's Estate, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 921 (Surr. Ct. 1941) ; Fletcher v.
Shepherd, 174 Ill. 262, 51 N. E. 212 (1898).
23. E. g., MAss. AwN. LAws, c. 189, § 5 (1933).
24. Harriman v. Gray, 49 Me. 537 (1860).
25. Louissa County v. Grimm, 203 Iowa 23, 212 N. W. 324 (1927); Western
States Finance Co. v. Ruff, 108 Ore. 442, 215 Pac. 501 (1923).
26. Boorum v. Tucker, 51 N. J. Eq. 135, 26 Atl. 456 (Ch. 1893) ; Elmendorf v.
Lockwood, 57 N. Y. 322 (1874).
27. McMahon v. Russell, 17 Fla. 698 (1880) ; Freuch v. Lord, 69 Me. 537 (1879).
28. Nickerson v. Nickerson, 235 Mass. 348, 126 N. E. 834 (1920); Johns v.
Anchors, 153 Ala. 498, 45 So. 218 (1907) ; Sanford v. Kane, 133 Ill. 199, 24 N. E. 414
(1890).
29. When contract for sale of husband's land is made before marriage, his future
wife acquires no inchoate right of dower, and cannot claim it against the purchaser.
Detwiler v. Capone, 357 Pa. 495, 55 A. 2d 380 (1947).
30. A covenant of seisin is not broken by an outstanding inchoate right of dower.
Whieler v. Hicks, 5 Blackf. 100 (Ind. 1839). The ordinary covenant of warranty is
not breached by the outstanding inchoate right of dower in the land conveyed. Massey
v. Craine, 1 M'Cord 489 (S. C. 1821). A covenant that the grantor was unmarried
was breached where the grantee was subsequently unable to sell the property because
the grantor's wife refused to release her dower right in the premises. Brusco v. Pate,
51 R. I. 222, 153 Atl. 311 (1931).
31. Trotter v. Lewis, 185 Md. 528, 45 A. 2d 329 (Md. 1946) (purchaser willing
to take incumbered title-court refused husband's request to order sale free of wife's
inchoate dower) ; Bahl v. Menger, 283 Pa. 508, 129 Atl. 459 (1925) ; Ford v. Street,
129 Va. 437, 106 S. E. 379 (1921) ; Bateman v. Riley, 72 N. J. Eq. 316, 73 At. 1006
(Ch. 1906).
32. Brookings v. Cooper, 256 Mass. 121, 152 N. E. 243 (1926) ; Feldman v. Lis-
ansky, 239 N. Y. 81, 145 N. E. 746 (1924).
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the dower into court or to execute a bond to indemnify the wife against
the loss which would result if she should survive her vendor husband. 3
Some courts, under this third view, require the purchaser to pay interest
on the sum thus retained. 34 The obvious objection to a court's refusal
to allow abatement in the purchase price is that the purchaser cannot ac-
quire clear title to the property. Various objections which have been
raised to the allowance of an abatement are that the court is in fact mak-
ing a new contract for the parties; that the title is rendered unmarketable,
not by allowing the abatement but by recognizing the wife's interest;
that the husband would be induced to coerce the wife' into releasing her
inchoate dower right; and that the court is faced with the difficulty of
ascribing a present money value to the inchoate right or computing the
difference between the market value of the land with her release and the
market value without it.s 5 The problem is further complicated by the
effect given the purchaser's knowledge that his vendor is married, 6 the
effect of the wife's knowledge of the contract,3 7 and the effect of the pro-
curement of the wife's refusal by the husband.38 Legislatures have at-
tempted to provide a statutory solution to the problem; for example, the
West Virginia Code provides for the calculation and payment of the
estimated value of the inchoate dower to the reluctant spouse at the
suit of either party to the contract.3 9 Although confusing, it is clear
that any one of the above academic and judicial treatments presents a
more satisfactory solution than the old English practice of awarding specific
performance and imprisoning the husband until the wife consented to
release her interest.4°
Rights of the wife after husband has conveyed without "wife's joining
in the conveyance: As between the wife and the purchaser, we have seen
that courts, motivated by a feeling that inchoate dower ought to be en-
titled to judicial protection, will sever the inchoate interest of the wife
from the husband's interest in property which he has contracted to con-
vey without the wife's joinder. If the husband actually conveys without
the wife's joinder, this act of the husband, whether in the nature of an
33. Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 203 S. C. 59, 26 S. E. 2d 175 (1943) ; Reed
v. Phillips, 191 Ark. 58, 83 S. W. 2d 554 (1935); City of Murray v. Holcomb, 243
Ky. 287, 47 S. W. 2d 1026 (1932) ; RESTATEmENT, CONTRAcTS § 365, Illus. 4 (1932).
34. Minge v. Green, 176 Ala. 343, 58 So. 381 (1912).
35. Where a statute gives a widow a right of election, her interest, affected by
whether or not there were surviving children, is said to add further uncertainty to the
computation. E. g., Wis. STAT. §§ 233.08, 233.12-.14 (1943).
36. In Long v. Chandler, 10 Del. Ch. 339, 351, 92 Atl. 256, 261 (Ch. 1914), it is
said: "When one negotiates with a married man he may rightly assume the existence
of such harmony between husband and wife that she would join in performing his con-
tracts of sale and the purchaser cannot be held to have taken chances on her doing so."
See Peeler v. Levy, 26 N. J. Eq. 330, 332 (Ch. 1875) (specific performance denied
where the party asking it had notice at the time the contract was made that the prom-
isor could not perform except by the consent or concurrence of the wife) ; cf. Caple
v. Crane, 10 Ohio App. 461 (1947).
37. Hoffstot v. Dickinson, 71 F. Supp. 897 (S. D. W. Va. 1947) (where there
was no evidence that the wife of the owner ever made an offer to prospective ptir-
chaser or accepted an offer made by him, she was not bound by the alleged acceptance
of her husband of the purchaser's offer) ; Kutschinski v. Zank, 307 Mich. 260, 11 N.
W. 2d 881 (1943) ; Stein v. Francis, 91 N. J. Eq. 205, 109 AtI. 737 (Ch. 1919).
38. Aiple-Hemmelmann Real Estate Co. v. Spelbrink, 211 Mo. 671, 111 S. W. 480
(1908) (specific performance will not be granted where the wife refuses to join in
the deed and where there is no evidence of fraud on the husband's part in procuring
her refusal) ; Young v. Paul, 10 N. J. Eq. 401 (Ct. Err. & App. 1855).
39. W. VA. CODE § 4101 (1943) ; Ruby v. Ruby, 112 W. Va. 62, 163 S. E. 717
(1932).
40. See Hall v. Hardy, 3 P. Wins. 187, 24 Eng. Rep. 1023 (Ch. 1733).
alienation, conveyance, or other charge, will not defeat dower. 4 The
wife's rights during the husband's lifetime against an alienee from the
husband by deed in which she did not join give rise to some of the most
perplexing problems in the law of dower. A conflict of policies arises
where a wife seeks an injunction against waste to protect her inchoate
dower interest in lands conveyed by her husband without her joinder.
In Brown v. Brownr, 42 the first case found on this subject, the assignee of
the purchaser was enjoined from clearing the land of timber because the
alleged waste would substantially impair the value of the land, but it was
recognized that if the assignee's action might result in materially enhancing
the land's value, to enjoin it might prevent a substantial improvement.
43
This decision remained unchallenged for a short time only, for a New
York court created another conflict in the law by its holding in Rumsey
v. Sullivan.4 4 Here, the court refused to enjoin waste by the grantee of
the husband who took by a conveyance in which the wife did not join,
and who was exploiting the land for oil for the first time. A dissenting
opinion was based on the principle that the wife would clearly be en-
titled to dower in the producing oil and gas wells if she survived her
husband,45 and that she therefore had an inchoate right which should be
protected by a court of equity. In Tatum v. Tatum, 46 factually similar but
subsequent to the Rumnsey case, it was held that a wife's inchoate right
of dower is entitled to be protected on the ground that the right is like the
interest of a contingent remainderman who may be protected by im-
pounding funds sufficient to cover damages and investing them for the
benefit of the expectancy.47 The court in Runsey v. Sullivan said, "While
the rights of a widow are well settled, I find no case in which a court
of equity has restrained acts similar to those complained of at the in-
stance of a wife having only an inchoate right of dower in the premises.
... I am unable to find any case in which waste has been enjoined, dur-
ing the lifetime of the husband upon the suit of the wife." 48 If a court
were to follow the rule that the value of the inchoate dower right shall
be ascertained upon the value of her potential rights of dower in the land
at the date of the deed of assignment, 49 a result might be reached where
the husband opened the wells before the conveyance different from the
result reached where the husband's assignee opened the wells after con-
veyance, for in the latter situation it would seem that it was the grantee's
act which gave value to the inchoate right of dower. But since the land
in both the Rumsey and Tatum cases was oil lafid at the time of the con-
veyance and had a potential value which might have accrued to the wife,
it is no answer to say that even if the grantee were to commit waste and
exhaust the resources the wife is theoretically in the same position as she
was at the time of conveyance. Furthermore, the marital consideratiois
and policies underlying the rule of law ivhich renders a husband unim-
peachable for waste do not completely apply to the husband's grantee.
41. Patterson v. Durand Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 303 Ill. App. 128, 24
N. E. 2d 740 (1940) ; Hopkins v. Magruder, 34 F. Supp. 381 (D. Md. 1940).
42. 94 S. C. 492, 78 S. E. 447 (1913).
43. Id. at 495; 78 S. E. at 448.
44. 166 App. Div. 246, 150 N. Y. Supp. 287 (4th Dep't 1914).
45. Coates v. Cheever, 1 Cow. 460 (N. Y. 1823).
46. 174 Ark. 110, 295 S. W. 720 (1927).
47. Watson v. Wolff-Goldman Realty Co., 95 Ark. 18, 128 S. W. 581 (1910).
48. It is unfortunate that the court's attention was not directed to Brown v.
Brown, 94 S. C. 492, 495, 78 S. E. 447, 448 (1913).
49. See Note, 34 A. L. R. 1021 (1925).
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Can it not be said that a grantee buys only the interest of the husband, as
distinguished from that of the wife, so that there is no reason for per-
mitting him to open mines and wells and work them to extinction thus
destroying a valuable interest of the wife? The policy of the courts in
Brown v. Brown and Tatum v. Tatum may be summed up thus: "Life,
Liberty, and Dower," 50 whereas Rumsey v. Sullivan gives the impression
that the quotation should read, "Life, Liberty, Free Alienability of Land,
and then Dower." 51
Effect of divorce and misconduct: At common law dower is not
barred by the wife's misconduct during marriage. 52 A wife who com-
mits adultery does not forfeit dower in her husband's estate.5 3  Absent
a statute, desertion or abandonment by the wife does not affect the dower
right, for her interest does not depend upon the existence of the family
relation at the death of the husband. 54 Desertion followed by bigamous
marriage does not deprive the guilty spouse of her dower in the deserted
husband's lands.5 5 In some jurisdictions the wrongful killing of the
husband, whether the nature of the offense is murder 56 or voluntary
manslaughter, 57 is not a sufficient act of misconduct requiring punishment
by depriving a Wife of her right to dower. Statutory modifications, how-
ever, generally provide that if a wife voluntarily leaves her husband and
lives in adultery, dower is barred unless a reconciliation is effected. 58 Un-
less a statute provides to the contrary, dower or any statutory substi-
tute is barred by an absolute divorce 59 whether procured by the hus-
band for the misconduct of the wife or by the wife for misconduct by the
husband. 60 A divorce a mensa et thoro does not have this effect. 61
Similarly, dower will not be barred by a decree which is set aside be-
cause it was fraudulently obtained by the husband, 62 or by a decree which
is void for want of jurisdiction,63 or by an interlocutory decree.64
50. CHILTON, PROBATE COURT LAW AND PRACTIcE 372 (Lilly's Abr. p. 666).
51. Cf. WALSir, LAW OF PROPERTY § 117 (2d ed. 1927), for a situation where hus-
band mortgages to A, later sells to B without the wife's joining in the deed, and B now
pays off the mortgagee, A.
52. Lakin v. Lakin, 84 Mass. 45 (1861) ; see Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U. S.
216, 227 (1934).
53. Gordon v. Dickison, 131 Il1. 141, 23 N. E. 439 (1890) ; Cogswell v. Tibbets, 3
N. H. 41 (1824) (in the absence of statute, mere adultery by the wife is no bar to
dower).
54. Swift v. Reasonover, 168 Tenn. 305, 77 S. W. 2d 809 (1935) ; Arnout's Estate,
283 Pa. 49, f28 Atl. 661 (1925) ; Nye's Appeal, 126 Pa. 341, 17 Atl. 618 (1889);
Potier v. Barclay, 15 Ala. 439 (1849) ; Thayer v. Thayer, 14 Vt. 107 (1842).
55. Cox v. Cox, 95 Okla. 14, 217 Pac. 493 (1923).
56. Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 S. E. 794 (1888).
57. Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S. W. 487 (1916).
58. Morello v. Cantalupo, 91 N. J. Eq. 415, 111 Atl. 255 (Ch. 1920).
59. Hamm v. Butler, 215 Ala. 572, 112 So. 141 (1927).
60. Block v. P & G Realty Co., 96 N. J. Eq. 159, 124 Atl. 372 (Ch. 1924) ; Mc-
Laughlin v. McLaughlin, 202 Ala. 16, 79 So. 354 (1918). Contra: North v. North,
339 Mo. 1226, 100 S. W. 2d 582 (1936) (statute involved) ; Knapp v. Knapp, 303 Ill.
535, 135 N. E. 732 (1922).
61. Cole v. Blankenship, 30 F. 2d 211 (C. C. A. 4th 1929) ; see In re Kehl's Estate,
215 Wis. 353, 254 N. W. 639 (1934). But cf. Gallagher v. Gallagher, 101 Wis. 202,
77 N. W. 145 (1898) (where there has been a final division of property under a
statute).
62. Wright v. Wright, 8 N. J. Eq. 143 (Ch. 1849).
63. Cheely v. Clayton, 110 U. S. 701 (1884).
64. Bryon v. Bryon, 134 App. Div. 320, 119 N. Y. Supp. 41 (2d Dep't 1909).
Since dower is governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the
land lies, the effect of a foreign divorce depends exclusively on the laws
of the state in which the husband's lands are situated.65  Unless statutes
expressly or impliedly preserve the dower right, a valid foreign divorce
will cut off the wife's interest in the husband's lands in another state.68
Some statutes require that the foreign divorce decree be rendered on the
basis of the wife's misconduct, or upon some other enumerated ground,6 7
but not otherwise.68 If under statute a divorced wife is entitled to dower in
her former husband's estate the subsequent remarriage of either the hus-
band 69 or the wife 70 will not affect her dower right,71 but she may
effectively release such right by accepting alimony or other provisions in
lieu of dower by agreement or by a consent decree in a divorce proceed-
ing. 2
DowER IN EQUITABLE ESTATES
Mortgaged estates: Possibly conceptual distinctions between mort-
gages as liens and as transfers of title might account for differing dower
rights in mortgaged lands, 73 but it is doubtful that they are the only factor.
Where the wife does not relinquish dower to the husband's mortgagee the
mortgagee's security is the husband's interest in the property subject to
the wife's inchoate right of dower.7 4  The outstanding right of dower is
cured by the subsequent death of the wife.75 A purchase money mortgage
does not require execution by the wife in order to become binding upon
her, and is superior to her right of dower despite the doctrine of "in-
stantaneous seisin."' 76 A mortgage to secure any other debt requires
execution by the wife.77  If a wife releases her right of dower in a mort-
gage deed she is barred from claiming dower against the mortgagee, his
assigns, and all persons claiming under them, but as to all others her
right of dower remains unimpaired.7 The strong dissenting opinion in
65. See Block v. P & G Realty Co., 96 N. J. Eq. 159, 124 Atl. 372 (Ch. 1924);
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 202 Ala. 16, 79 So. 354 (1918).
66. Under the "full faith and credit clause" valid foreign divorces will be recog-
nized as dissolving the marriage and therefore barring dower. Shirley v. Paris, 121
S. C. 260, 113 S. E. 788 (1921).
67. Gould v. Crow, 57 Mo. 200 (1874).
68. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 122 Misc. 104, 203 N. Y. Supp. 140 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
69. Stahl v. Stahl, 114 Ill. 375, 2 N. E. 160 (1885).
70. Chrisman v. Linderman, 202 Mo. 605, 100 S. W. 1090 (1907).
71. Statutes have changed this rule. Rice v. Lumley, 10 Ohio St. 596 (1857).
72. Johnson v. Commonwealth Building & Loan Ass'n, 182 Ark. 226, 31 S. W. 2d
136 (1930).
73. 2 TIFFANY, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 230, 609 (2d ed. 1920) ; Bua icK, LAW
OF REAL PROPERTY § 184 (1914).
74. Cancilla v. Bondy, 353 Pa. 249, 44 A. 2d 586 (1947) ; Thomas v. Thomas, 245
Ala. 607, 18 So. 2d 544 (1944) ; Turner v. Washington Realty Co., 130 S. C. 501, 126
S. E. 137 (1925) ; Land v. Shipp, 98 Va. 284, 36 S. E. 391 (1900). As against the
mortgagee, a Wisconsin statute prohibits dower in lands mortgaged prior to the mar-
riag75. Lyman v. Gedney, 114 Ill. 388, 29 N. E. 282 (1885).
76. State ex rel. Place v. Bland, 353 Mo. 639, 183 S. W. 2d 878 (1944) ; Chalk
v. Chalk, 291 Ky. 702, 165 S. W. 2d 534 (1942) ; Bell v. Mayor of New York, 10 Paige
49 (N. Y. Ch. 1843). Statutes in the following states give a purchase money mort-
gage priority over dower interests: Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland (and any
other paramount lien), Massachusetts (no dower in transitory estates), Michigan,
Montana, South Carolina, West Virginia, Wisconsin (only as against the mortgagee).
77. See Mills v. Van Voorhis, 20 N. Y. 412, 419 (1859).
78. Duncan v. Johnson, 123 F. 2d 392 (C. C. A. 4th 1941) ; In re Reynolds' Estate,
90 Utah 415, 62 P. 2d 270 (1936) ; Green -v. Estabrook, 168 Ind. 123, 79 N. E. 373
(1906) ; Mandel v. McClave, 46 Ohio St. 407, 22 N. E. 290 (1889). Georgia statute
makes it impossible for a wife to waive her dower rights in a mortgage or other lien.
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Byrnes v. Owen" suggests' that when the wife has released her inchoate
dower right by joining in the mortgage deed, there is a duty on the hus-
band to preserve her right by paying off the mortgage. In Van Veen v.
Van Veen, 80 where a mortgage note was worded "we promise to pay"
and was signed by both husband and wife, the court held it to be a
joint debt, not merely a release of dower. Reformation of the mortgage
instrument may be permitted against the wife claiming dower under
certain circumstances."' A special protection has been afforded the dower
right in homesteads making them only secondarily liable for the satis-
faction of a mortgage debt in which the wife joined.8 2  A wife is given
a right of redemption to protect her inchoate right of dower in her hus-
band's estate.8 3  Upon redemption the right of dower, relinquished by
signing the mortgage, re-attaches as though the mortgage had never been
given. 84  Any defect in the title due to an outstanding right of dower
is cured by the foreclosure of a mortgage in which the wife joined.8 5
Some jurisdictions go further and say that the dower right is not ex-
tinguished by judicial sale until the statutory period of redemption has
run.88 The courts divide on 'the question of the indispensability of the
wife as a party to the foreclosure proceedings. The general rule is that
the inchoate right of dower is not extinguished and that the right of re-
demption is not impaired by proceedings during the lifetime of the hus-
band unless the wife is made a party thereto. If the wife is not a party,
the purchaser takes subject to her equity of redemption.8 ' Where a
foreclosure proceeding requires mere entry by the mortgagee, statutes
would most likely handle this by requiring notice, at least to a widow.
8 8
There is some authority that even where the wife joins in signing the
mortgage deed her inchoate interest in the husband's equity of redemption
will be protected by transferring this interest to any surplus proceeds re-
maining after the foreclosure sale.8 9 However, the majority of jurisdic-
tions treat such surplus as personalty and apply the common law rule
that a wife has no dower right in the husband's personal property. 0
Legislatures in some jurisdictions have changed the common law and
79. 243 N. Y. 211, 153 N. E. 51 (1926) ; Turner v. Kuehnle, 70 N. J. Eq. 61, 62
Atl. 327 (1905) ; Stroup v. Stroup, 140 Ind. 179, 39 N. E. 864 (1894) ; cf. Redman's
Adm'x v. Redman, 112 Ky. 760, 66 S. W. 745 (1902).
80. 213 Iowa 323, 238 N. W. 718 (1931).
81. Myerscough v. Day, 10 ONT. WxLY. NoTEs 124 (1916) (a widow could not
obtain rectification of a deed in equity as against the wife's inchoate right of dower
where the wife signed to bar her dower in fifty instead of the one hundred acres con-
veyed by her husband, where the wife testified she read the deed and knew of the mis-
take).
82. Brune v. Rathbun, 204 S. W. 2d 705 (Mo. 1947) ; Bissell v. Bissell, 120 Iowa
127, 94 N. W. 465 (1903) ; Trego v. Studley, 106 Iowa 742, 75 N. W. 179 (1898).
83. Evans v. Robertson, 177 Ark. 419, 6 S. W. 2d 536 (1928) ; Fitcher v. Grif-
fiths, 216 Mass. 174, 103 N. E. 471 (1913); McMichael v. Russel, 68 App. Div. 104,
74 N. Y. Supp. 212 (1st Dep't 1902).
84. Hamm v. Butler, 215 Ala. 572, 112 So. 141 (1927) ; see Reed v. Morrison, 12
S. & R. 18, 22 (Pa. 1824) ; cf. Wedge v. Moore, 6 Cush. 8 (Mass. 1850).
85. Calder v. Jenkins, 42 N. Y. State Rep. 38, 16 N. Y. Supp. 797 (1891).
86. Bowden v. Hadley, 138 Iowa 711, 116 N. W. 689 (1908).
87. Denton v. Nanny, 8 Barb. 618 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1850). Contra: Bowden v.
Hadley, 138 Iowa 711, 116 N. W. 689 (1908).
88. MAss. ANN. LAWs, vol. 6, c. 202, § 3 (1933).
89. Virgin v. Virgin, 189 Ill. 144, 59 N. E. 586 (1901) ; Shobe v. Brinson, 148
Ind. 285, 47 N. E. 625 (1897) (dower interest is computed on the basis of the entire
proceeds, but payable only out of the surplus).
90. Frost v. Peacock, 4 Edw. Ch. 678 (N. Y. 1846) ; Bell v. Mayor of New York,
10 Paige 49 (N. Y. Ch. 1843); 3 JoNEs, LAw OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 2178 (8th ed. 1928).
give the wife a right in her husband's personalty.91 A small minority,
following the doctrine of equitable conversion, protect the inchoate right
by permitting a fund of one-third of the surplus to be established for
her benefit and to remain intact during the joint lives of the husband
and wife with interest to the latter as a survivor.
92
Trust estates: Some of the problems treated in the foregoing section
on mortgaged estates arose in part from the doctrines evolved in the law
at a time when much of the land in England was held to uses. The
cestui que use held the equitable title; the legal title was held by the
feoffee to use. Prior to the Statute of Uses 13 the wife of the cestui que
use had no inchoate right in his equitable estate. By operation of the
statute, the "legal title" merged with the "equitable title" thus giving the
wife a right of dower in the now "legal" estate of her husband. The
statute did not preclude the possibility of equitable estates and the com-
mon law rule prohibiting inchoate dower in equitable estates persisted.9
Radnor v. Vandebendy 9 5 is generally thought of as the case which
crystalized the common law rule and deprived the wife of an inchoate
dower right in her husband's equitable estates for centuries to come, and
the rule continued unmodified in England until the Dower Act of 1834 6
which granted a wife dower in her husband's trust estate of inheritance.
There was no uniformity of acceptance of the law of England in the United
States, and needless to say the rule of the Radnor case was no exception.
Pennsylvania, for example, refused to follow the common law rule.97
Many states passed statutes rendering equitable estates subject to the
inchoate right of dower,98 while others adopted the English common law
rule. 9 The equitable interest acquired by a husband-vendee under a
contract of purchase is not subject to dower. 00 The wife of a trustee
91. Florida statute includes dower right in personal property. Statutes have been
passed in the following states transferring dower rights to surplus proceeds: Ken-
tucky, Virginia, West Virginia (dower interest computed on the basis of the entire
proceeds). The following states have given the wife an interest in her husband's per-
sonal property under Descent and Distribution statutes: Alabama, Arkansas, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Wis-
consin, Wyoming. See, e. g., Swearingen v. Swearingen's Ex'x, 302 Ky. 107, 194 S.
W. 2d 79 (1946).
92. Wood v. Price, 79 N. J. Eq. 14, 81 AtI. 664 (Ch. 1910) ; Unger v. Leiter, 32
Ohio 210 (1877) ; Greiner v. Klein, 28 Mich. 12 (1873) ; Denton v. Nanny, 8 Barb. 618
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1850) ; cf. Jordan v. Van Epps, 85 N. Y. 427 (1881).
93. 27 HEN. VIII, c. 10 (1535).
94. Vernon's Case, 4 Co. la, 76 Eng. Rep. 845 (K. B. 1572).
95. 1 Shower 69, 1 Eng. Rep. 48 (H. L. 1697). This crystallization was not in
accord with stare decisis, for forty-four years before the Radnor case a Court of
Chancery negated this possibility in Banks v. Sutton, 2 P. Wms. 700, 710, 24 Eng.
Rep. 922, 925 (Ch. 1732), quoting from a report of Fletcher v. Robinson (1653).
96. 3 & 4 Wit. IV, c. 105, § 3.
97. Reed v. Morrison. 12 S. & R. 18 (Pa. 1824) (equity of redemption) ; Shoe-
maker v. Walker, 2 S. & R. 554 (Pa. 1814) (trust estate).
98. E. g., Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Tennessee (when husband dies
intestate), Utah. Contra: Massachusetts.
99. In re Prasser's Will, 140 Wis. 92, 121 N. W. 643 (1909) (wife was given
dower from trust income payable to the husband; court reasoned that it was a legal
estate against all persons but the trustees).
100. Phifer v. Phifer, 157 N. C. 221, 72 S. E. 1006 (1911) ; Nortnass v. Pioneer
Townsite Co., 82 Neb. 382, 117 N. W. 951 (1908) ; Pritts v. Ritchey, 29 Pa. 71 (1857);
cf. Nichols v. Park, 78 App. Div. 95, 79 N. Y. Supp. 547 (1st Dep't 1903).
1948] NOTES
686 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96
is not entitled to dower in the trust estate.10' A conveyance by the hus-
band to a trustee does not bar dower if the husband retains the beneficial
interest, 0 2 but dower is lost if the trustee conveys to a third party
by order of the husband since the latter no longer retains his equitable
interest. 0 3 Since the decision in the Radnor case eminent common law
judges have apologized each time they applied the rule and obviously
have been dissatisfied with the result but have felt bound by precedent.
The Dower Act,' 0 4 abolishing the common law rule, placed England in
the same position as the majority of American jurisdictions. In retro-
spect, it can be said that the inchoate dower right emerged from this
anomalous period undiminished as a protected right, but still uncrystallized
as a vested property right.
RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES IN ESTATES SUBJECT TO DOWER
Husband's creditors: At common law a judgment rendered against
the husband and satisfied from lands of which he was then seised did
not act as a bar to a suit by the wife to have her dower assigned from
those lands, even though at the time of the sale the wife's right to dower
was inchoate.'0 5  There is some authority to the contrary. 0 6  Statutory
solutions have not resolved the conflicts. 07 The wife's inchoate right
of dower will not generally be defeated by an attempt of the husband's
judgment creditors to levy execution on realty subject to dower.'08 Such
a rule would seem to be a logical corollary to the rule that a husband can-
not by his own act deprive his wife of her right of dower, for merely adding
the court's judgment to the husband's act should not alter the result.10 9
Since the general rule is that a mere inchoate right of dower cannot be
reached by a wife's creditor," 0 perhaps those courts which allow the
husband's creditors to defeat the wife's right are motivated by a desire to
make the inchoate interest accessible to the creditors of at least one of
the spouses.
Adverse possessors: Courts have generally held that no adverse pos-
session against the husband in his lifetime, however long continued, will
bar the wife's dower.II The result is based on the fact that no right of
101. Dreckshage v. Dreckshage, 352 Mo. 78, 176 S. W. 2d 7 (1943); White v.
Drew, 42 Mo. 561 (1868) ; Derush v. Brown, 8 Ohio 412 (1838).
102. Goodheart v. Goodheart, 63 N. J. Eq. 746, 53 Atl. 135 (Ch. 1902) ; Davis v.
Logan, 9 Dana 185 (Ky. 1839).
103. Goodheart v. Goodheart, 63 N. 3. Eq. 746, 53 Atl. 135 (Ch. 1902).
104. 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 105, § 3.
105. BL. Com. 297 (Gavit's ed. 1941) ; 2 TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 511
(3d ed. 1939). In re Berrays' Estate, 322 Mo. 135, 126 S. W. 2d 209 (1939) ; Har-
mon v. Peery, 145 Va. 578, 134 S. E. 701 (1926) ; House v. Fowle, 22 Ore. 303, 29 Pac.
890 (1892).
106. In re Hester's Estate, 28 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1947).
107. E. g., IowA CODE § 636.5 (1946); Sturdevant v. Norris, 30 Iowa 65 (1870);
cf. MINN. STAT. §§ 519.02, 519.09 (1945); Wade v. Citizens State Bank, 158 Minn.
231, 197 N. W. 277 (1924).
108. Humphreys v. McKnight, 202 Ark. 715, 152 S. W. 2d 567 (1941) ; Ladshaw
v. Drake, 183 S. C. 536, 191 S. E. 713 (1937) ; Jewett v. Feldheiser, 68 Ohio St. 523,
67 N. E. 1072 (1903) ; Mills v. Ritter, 197 Pa. 353, 47 Atl. 194 (1900) ; Chase v. Van
Meter, 140 Ind. 321, 39 N. E. 455 (1894).
109. Colvin v. Enwer, 97 Fla. 48, 119 So. 148 (1929) (dower was not barred in
land sold, pursuant to court order, by the legal guardian of an insane husband).
110. Geiselman v. Wise, 137 Ohio St. 93, 28 N. E. 2d 199 (1940).
111. Cummings v. Schreur, 239 Mich. 178, 214 N. W. 199 (1927) ; Rook v. Hor-
ton, 190 N. C. 180, 129 S. E. 450 (1925) ; Lucas v. White, 120 Iowa 735, 95 N. W. 209
(1903) ; Williams v. Williams, 89 Ky. 381, 12 S. W. 760 (1889).
action against the disseisor is available to the wife while her dower is
still inchoate. *The terms of general statutes of limitation may or may not
clearly encompass the dower right-if they do, they control; if they do
not, the courts divide."12 Following the above reasoning for the protection
of the wife, it would seem that even the Married Women's Acts which
remove the wife's disabilities should not cause the statute of limitations
to run against her so long as her right cannot be asserted.113 Where the
statutory provision gives the wife dower only in lands of which the hus-
band dies seised, then an adverse possessor who divests the husband's in-
terest during coverture should also bar the wife's dower." 4 In Pennsyl-
vania, for example, a purchaser from a husband whose wife did not join
in the conveyance cannot bar the wife's dower by adverse possession, yet
an adverse possessqr who destroys the husband's title also bars the wife's
dower.11  Although a logical converse of the foregoing would seem to
prevent the wife of the adverse possessor from obtaining any dower
interest in the land until he gains clear title, the common law rule is to the
contrary on the theory that the disseisor "has seisin" even though wrong-
fully. acquired.1 1 6 Unless the wife is to be allowed to bring an action to
protect her inchoate dower in such cases or unless purchasers from a
husband as sole alienor are to be less favored in the law than strangers
to the land, such a distinction would appear unjustifiable.
The state-eminent domain: Where courts have been required to
adjudicate among the rights of the husband, the wife, and the state they
have found the conflict of interests too perplexing to permit of uniformity
of conclusion. This problem is clearly raised where land is taken under
the state's right of eminent domain.1n 7 Some courts hold that it is
necessary to make a woman having an inchoate right of dower a party
to the proceedings. 118 The financial solution to the problem is similarly
subject to a divergence of opinion. The majority of the courts, feeling
that the wife's inchoate right of dower is subordinate to the right of the
state to eminent domain," 9 emphasize that the wife's right cannot be as-
signed or granted, that there is no standard for determining its present
value,120 that the husband may, after all, outlive his wife,' 2 ' and hold that
112. Compare Rook v. Horton, 190 N. C. 180, 129 S. E. 450 (1925), with Sully
v. Nebergall, 30 Iowa 339 (1870). Cf. Arkansas statute which bars wife's dower in-
terest in lands held by an adverse possessor for seven years, or in lands conveyed by
husband, which conveyance is recorded for seven years.
113. Steele v. Gellatly, 41 Ill. 39 (1866).
114. Putney v. Vinton, 145 Mich. 219, 108 N. W. 655 (1906) ; Keys v. Keys, 11
Heisk. 425 (Tenn. 1872).
115. Winters v. DeTurk, 133 Pa. 359, 19 Atl. 354 (1890) ; see Cullen v. Motzer,
13 S. & R. 356, 359 (Pa. 1825).
116. TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 22 (3d ed. 1939) ; RESTATEMENT, PROP-
ERTY § 45 (1936), qualifies the common law so that the wife's dower right is defeasible
to the same extent as is her husband's adverse "title."
117. Legislatures may authorize others to take property for public use: Plecker
v. Rhodes, 30 Gratt. 795 (Va. 1878); Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H. R. R., 18 Wend.
9 (N. Y. 1837) (private corporation).
118. Summers v. Sullivan, 39 Mont. 42, 101 Pac. 166 (1909); Arnold v. Buffalo
R. & P. Ry. Co., 32 Pa. Super. 452 (1907). Contra: Wheeler v. Kirtland, 27 N. 3.
Eq. 534 (1875).
119. Salvatore v. Fuscellaro, 53 R. I. 271, 166 Atl. 26 (1933) ; Long v. Long, 99
Ohio St. 330, 124 N. E. 161 (1919) ; Flynn- v. Flynn, 171 Mass. 312, 50 N. E. 650
(1898) ; In re East 42nd Street, 167 Misc. 714, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 665 (1938).
120. See United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 46 F. Supp. 441, 446 (D. Md.
1942) ; Salvatore v. Fuscellaro, 53 R. I. 271, 166 Atl. 26 (1933).
121. See Long v. Long, 99 Ohio St. 330, 124 N. E. 161, 163 (1919).
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the wife's inchoate right of dower is destroyed.12 2 The minority of courts,
imbued with an obvious protective attitude toward dower, although allow-
ing the state's interest to prevail over the wife's interest in the land, have
transferred her interest by way of constructive trust to the fund which
is paid as compensation.12 3  The objections offered by the majority are
easily answered: the condemnation is not a voluntary assignment, but
a forced release; 1 24 the value of the inchoate fight is ascertainable'
2 5
and after all the wife may outlive the husband. Finally the public interest
is protected by virtue of the transfer of the wife's interest from the land
to the compensation. The denial of such a result on the ground that the
claim of dower does not exist in personalty and refusing to treat the
compensation as a substitute for the real estate appears to be a rationaliza-
tion designed to excuse the conclusion desired. Allowing the husband,
who could not have alone defeated his wife's right, to retain the full value
of the property and thus accomplish the undesired merely through the
accident of the state's intervention is a result more difficult to rationalize.
Purchaser at a tax sale: The question of whether an inchoate right of
dower is extinguished by a tax sale thus giving the purchaser a title free
of the wife's claim has also resulted in a conflict of decisions.,2 6  The
divergence is to some extent explained by the different terminologies of
the statutes involved, especially as to whether the tax sale is considered a
proceeding in rem or one in personam. It would also appear that here
again the conflict may be traceable to the introduction of a governmental
unit's interest into the sphere of the relative rights of the individuals in-
volved.
TAXATION
Federal: Originally, the courts reasoned that the relinquishment of
inchoate dower was fair consideration for the transfer of property to the
wife, and held that the husband was not liable 'for a gift tax. 2 7  Estate
taxation presented a greater problem, particularly if the wife claimed the
property under some form of marital agreement. Hence, here the law
of the state where the decedent's property was located was held to control
any recognition given the dower right in assessing the federal tax. 28
Gradually, the courts realized that the gift tax was intended to supple-
ment the estate tax by reaching those inter-vivos transfers which would
otherwise deplete the donor's estate, and that these taxes were in pari
122. Harris v. Kansas City, 293 Mo. 572, 239 S. W. 1077 (1922) (at least sus-
pended while the land was devoted to public use).
123. In It re Cropsey Avenue, 268 N. Y. 183, 197 N. E. 189 (1935), the court
created a trust in one-third of the award, income to be paid to the husband for life and
thereafter to the wife for life if she survived him. For another possible method of
computation, see American Blower Co. v. MacKenzie, 197 N. C. 152, 154, 147 S. E.
829, 831 (1929) ; Jackson v. Edwards, 7 Paige 386, 408 (N. Y. Ch. 1839).
124. Note, 7 MD. L. REv. 263 (1943).
125. See note 108 supra.
126. Compare Chalk v. Chalk, 291 Ky. 702, 165 S. W. 2d 534 (1943) (dower right,
whether inchoate or consummate, is subordinate to tax lien) ; Byington v. Carlin, 146
Iowa 301, 125 N. W. 233 (1910), wath Henze v. Mitchell, 93 Neb. 278, 140 N. W. 149
(1913) (insufficient service upon wife does not extinguish her dower rights).
127. McCaughn v. Carver, 19 F. 2d 126 (C. C. A. 3d 1927) ; Ferguson v. Dick-
son, 300 Fed. 961 (C. C. A. 3d 1924) ; Stubblefield v. United States, 6 F. Supp. 440
(Ct. Cl. 1934).
128. Blum v. Wardell, 270 Fed. 309 (N. D. Cal. 1920), aff'd, 276 Fed. 226 (C. C.
A. 9th 1921), cert. denied, 258 U. S. 617 (1921) ; Randolph v. Craig, 267 Fed. 993
(M. D. Tenn. 1920).
materia and must be construed together. 129  The wording of the appli-
cable sections of the Revenue Act of 1932,130 however, did not articulate
this view: Section 804 said that relinquishment of dower shall not be
consideration in money's worth for the purpose of a deduction in the de-
cedent's estate tax, but section 503 merely assessed a gift tax when the
property was transferred for less than adequate or full consideration.
32
This discrepancy caused much confusion in the lower federal courts as
to whether the gift tax should be interpreted separately or in conjunc-
tion with the estate tax.133  In Merrill v. Fahs'34 the Supreme Court
finally clarified the dispute with a 5 to 4 decision which held that in view
of the pari uzteria circumstances, section 804 of the estate tax was to
be considered applicable to section 503 of the gift tax in order to prevent
tax avoidance. Thus, the donor of a gift of property to his wife is taxed
under the gift tax, and the executor or administrator must, in general,
include the widow's share in the decedent's gross taxable estate.' 35
State: State courts have gone into mental gymnastics in order to
define dower in such a way as to make it taxable under the various gift
and inheritance laws without disturbing its interpretations in other fields
of law. As can be expeded, the courts are divided between those which
hold the dower interest taxable,136 and those which allow a deduction for
it.' 37  It appears that where the dower rights are taxable the courts
have subjectively reasoned that the legislature can tax, that taxation is
the lifeblood of the state, and that since Married Women's Acts have
been passed no valid reason exists for dxempting this "feudal hangover"
from taxation. The United States Supreme Court's decision in the
Merrill case has provided a more direct approach for courts confronted
with this problem.
POWER OF LEGISLATURE TO ALTER DOWER RIGHTS
The usual hornbook statement is that state legislatures have the
absolute right to enlarge, abridge, or abolish the wife's inchoate right
of dower before the husband's death.' 38  Statutes thus altering dower
129. See Sanford's Estate v. Comm'r, 308 U. S. 39, 44 (1939).
130. 47 STAT. 169-289 (1932).
131. INT. REV. CODE § 812(b) (5).
132. INT. REV. CODE § 1002.
133. Release of dower rights is consideration, and husband is not taxable: Lasker
v. Comm'r, 138 F. 2d 989 (C. C. A. 7th 1943) ; Herbert Jones, 1 T. C. 1207 (1943).
Release of dower rights is not consideration and husband is taxable: Comm'r v. Bris-
tol, 121 F. 2d 129 (C. C. A. 1st 1941) ; John D. Archbold, 42 B. T. A. 453 (1940).
All these cases involved bona fide business dealings at arm's length; dicta in almost
all cases indicated that had the gift been made to the wife to evade taxes, the husband
would have been liable.
134. 324 U. S. 308 (1945) ; cf. Comm'r v. Wemyss, 324 U. S. 303 (1945). But cf.
Comm'r v. Converse, 163 F. 2d 131 (C. C. A. 2d 1947) (such transfer when included
in a divorce decree becomes a debt of the husband, and the wife's release of her marital
rights was a valid consideration).
135. Empire Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 94 F. 2d 307 (C. C. A. 4th 1938) ; Jacobs v.
Comm'r, 34 F. 2d 233 (C. C. A. 8th 1929) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.14 (1942). For
a more thorough discussion of consummate dower rights under estate taxation, see
CCH INa., EsT. & Gn=r TAX SERV. 11 3400-3405.
"136. State v. Lane, 134 Ark. 71, 203 S. W. 17 (1918) ; State ex rel. Pettit v. Pro-
bate Court, 137 Minn. 238, 163 N. W. 285 (1917) ; Corporation Commission v. Dunn,
174 N. E. 679, 94 S. E. 481 (1917) ; Billings v. People, 189 IIl. 472, 59 N. E. 798
(1901), aff'd, 188 U. S. 97 (1903).
137. In re Estate of Strahan, 93 Neb. 828, 142 N. W. 678 (1913) (this is now a
community property state) ; Crenshaw v. Moore, 124 Tenn. 528, 137 S. W. 924 (1911).
138. E. g., Note, 20 A. L. R. 1330 (1922).
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rights have repeatedly been held constitutional. 3 9 An opinion that the
legislature could not divest the inchoate right of dower in a Missouri
case 140 was later disapproved.' 4 ' Some states, however, appear to be
committed to the position that the legislature does not have the power to
change the relative rights of the husband and wife at least to the extent of
increasing her dower interest.' The dogma that legislation is not valid
if it divests the wife's vested rights after the death of her husband seems
similarly well fortified.'4 3  There would appear to be no reason to ob-
ject to statutes which prospectively modify the wife's inchoate right of
dower just as property rights may be affected. The justification for the
distinction between the constitutionality of legislation dealing with dower
consummate and dower inchoate is otherwise difficult to see. The argu-
ment customarily advanced is unconvincing, for in fact, both are creatures
of the law. As to the contingency that the husband may survive the
wife, contingent property interests have long been recognized in our law.
Statutes which have been enacted affecting dower generally, have
necessarily affected inchoate dower. For example, community property
states would have no rights of dower or inchoate dower.Y44 A jurisdic-
tion which gives a wife a testamentary share instead of dower normally
would deny any right in the nature of an inchoate right of dower. It is
obvious, of course, that statutes giving the wife dower in only the lands
of which the husband dies seised would for s6me purposes create a
different result from the rule that dower attaches to all property of which
the husband was seised at any time during coverture. 45 Finally, statutes
reenacting the common law or statutes giving the wife an election would
not settle inchoate dower problems.
PRIVATE DEVICES TO AvoID DOWER
In spite of the protection which courts have afforded dower, clever
conveyancers have usually been able to devise some effective method to
bar inchoate dower. From the earliest'method of conveying a fee to the
Crown and taking back a life estate to the more modem method of a
trust device, the utilization of equitable estates has been a most fertile
field. The use of various limitations in conveyances has also been suc-
cessful: a conveyance to the husband for life, remainder to the son, in
the absence of fraud was held to bar the wife's statutory dower rights;146
in a conveyance giving the husband a life estate with a remainder to
his heirs, it was held that dower did not attach to the life estate, but the
result would be different in a jurisdiction where the rule in Shelley's
139. Randall v. Kreiger, 23 Wall. 137 (U. S. 1874) ; Classen v. Heath, 389 Ill.
183, 58 N. E. 2d 889 (1945) (inchoate right of dower in property owned by husband
at time of divorce on grounds of husband's fault could be changed, modified, or abol-
ished by legislature) ; Melizet's Appeal, 17 Pa. 449 (1851).
140. Williams v. Courtney, 77 Mo. 587 (1883).
141. Chouteau v. Mo. Pac. R. R., 122 Mo. 375, 30 S. W. 299 (1894).
142. Gerhardt v. Sullivan, 107 N. J. Eq. 374, 152 At. 663 (Ch. 1930) ; Jenkins
v. Jenkins, 82 N. C. 208 (1880) ; Wesson & Hunting v. Johnson, 66 N. C. 189 (1872);
Sutton v. Askew, 66 N. C. 172 (1872).
143. E. g., Morrison v. Rice, 35 Minn. 436, 29 N. W. 168 (1886) ; Strong v. Clem,
12 Ind. 37 (1859).
144. E. g., North Dakota, South Dakota. But cf. OHIO GEN. CoDE § 10502-1
(1938), which has been interpreted to have abolished consummate dower, but pro-
vided for inchoate dower, Geiselman v. Wise, 137 Ohio St. 93, 28 N. E. 2d 199 (1940).
145. See cases collected in note 114 mrpra.
146. Osborn v. Osborn, 102 Kan. 890, 172 Pac. 23 (1918).
Case had not been abolished. 147 Similarly, a purchase of land by a hus-
band in the name of another does not give the wife a dower right therein.14
The use of the entity theory of a corporation is another device which has
been used in an attempt to cut off the wife's dower rights. 4  The creation
of a joint tenancy bars inchoate dower, 50 but where the right of survivor-
ship in joint tenancies has been abolished, dower attaches. 15' There is
also authority that partition sales operate to destroy the inchoate dower
in the land. 152 Another of the more successful methods has been the
employment of ante-nuptial agreements and conveyances.
15
3
CONCLUSION
From a study of the cases it becomes clear why no really useful
definition of the nature and characteristics of inchoate dower can be de-
vised. By a careful selection of cases from varying jurisdictions involving
the numerous potential incidents of the inchoate right of dower a formi-
dable line of authority could be cited for the proposition that it is a "vested"
property right, with the characteristic of inalienability as the exception.
Philosophically this might be a comforting concept, but it is apparent
that such a rule would serve no useful purpose in the solution of any
particular problem. Courts long ago adopted dower as a favorite in
order to protect the otherwise helpless wife. As married women have,
through the centuries, acquired more rights, including the right to have
their own separate property, courts have been more prone to treat the
protection of dower as a policy diminishing in importance and subject
to countervailing policies. The rise in importance of other policies, es-
pecially those in favor of free alienability of property and taxation, might
well have contributed to this result. The continued subjection of the
former favorite to modem overriding considerations by the courts is to
be expected. We have reached the point where it might be said that the
name attached to the inchoate dower right in a particular case or act is
merely an indication of the feeling of a court or legislature towards inchoate
dower and its importance as a social necessity.
G. W. G.
J.T.M.
F.H.Y.
147. Bodkin v. Wright, 266 Ky. 798, 100 S. W. 2d 824 (1937) ; Gilmore v. Sellars,
145 N. C. 283, 59 S. E. 73 (1907) ; Harriot v. Harriot, 25 App. Div. 245, 49 N. Y.
Supp. 447 (lst Dep't 1898).
148. Nash v. Kirschoff, 166 Minn. 464, 208 N. W. 193 (1926); Whitmire v.
Wright, 22 S. C. 446 (1884) (no inchoate dower in long term leaseholds). Statutes
barring dower in wild lands: Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire.
149. Telis v. Tells, 132 N. J. Eq. 25, 26 A. 2d 249 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942) ; Poil-
Ion v. Poillon, 90 App. Div. 71, 85 N. Y. Supp. 689 (1st Dep't 1904).
150. O'Grady v. Deery, 45 A. 2d 295 (N. H. 1946) ; Babbitt v. Day, 41 N. J. Eq.
392, 5 AtI. 275 (Ch. 1886) ; Cockrill v. Armstrong, 31 Ark. 580 (1876) ; see Turner
v. Turner, 185 Va. 505, 506, 39 S. E. 2d 299, 301 (1946) (one joint tenant's right in
the joint estate is superior to the inchoate dower right of the wife of another joint
tenant). Statutes in Maryland and New Jersey specifically state that there is no
dower in lands held by joint tenancy.
151. Turner v. Turner, 185 Va. 505, 506, 39 S. E. 2d 299, 301 (1946); Reed v.
Kennedy, 2 Strob. L. 67 (S. C. 1847) ; Weir v. Humphries, 39 N. C. 264 (1846).
152. Statutes to this effect have been passed in Missouri and Virginia. Turner
v. Turner, 185 Va. 505, 506, 39 S. E. 2d 299, 301 (1946) (wife's inchoate right did
not follow the land but attached to the proceeds of the sale even though she was not
a party to the proceedings) ; Russell v. Russell, 63 Ohio App. 33, 25 N. E. 2d 299
(1939) (under partition sale in bankruptcy wife's right attached to proceeds of sale);
O'Steen v. O'Steen, 204 Ala. 397, 85 So. 547 (1920).
153. Harrison v. Harrison, 198 Ark. 64, 127 S. W. 2d 270 (1939).
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Legislation for Treatment of a New Category of
Juvenile Offenders
Although every state has some form of Juvenile Court system, its
application is limited generally to those offenders who are less than six-
teen or eighteen years old.- The legislation to be discussed in this Note
is designed to apply to those youthful offenders who are not within the
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Courts, but are less than twenty-one years
of age. The first major difference between the legislation to be discussed
herein and the Juvenile Court system is, therefore, that it is directed
toward a different group of offenders. As early as 1908, England
considered the offenders in this age group (sixteen to twenty-
one) sufficiently deserving of special consideration to warrant the estab-
lishment of the Borstal System.2  The original act and later amendments
established a special court procedure for the trial of these offenders, and
special institutions which were designed for rehabilitation rather than
punishment, giving the youthful offender an opportunity to escape con-
finement in prisons, and to prepare himself for his return to the com-
munity.
3
In the United States, however, no particular measures were enacted
for this group until very recently.4  In 1940, the American Law In-
stitute's Criminal Justice-Youth Committee drafted the Uniform Youth
Correction Authority Act.5 This act has been the model for legislation
enacted in California in 1941 and in Wisconsin and Minnesota in 1947.
It provides that offenders up to twenty-one years of age and not sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Courts should be tried in criminal
courts, but instead of being sentenced in the usual manner should be com-
mitted to an administrative group to determine the disposition to be made
1. See, e. g., GEN. STAT. KAN. ANN. § 38-402 (Corrick, 1935) (only children under
sixteen come under the Juvenile Court Act) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 199.010 (1946) (act
applies to males seventeen or under and females eighteen or under). In Pennsylvania
the Juvenile Court Act applied only to children under sixteen until as recently as 1939,
when the statutes were amended to raise the age to eighteen. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 11,
§ 243 (Purdon, 1939). In Wyoming the Juvenile Court Act applies to persons of either
sex under 21 years of age, but this is exceptional. WYo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 58-607
(1945).
2. Prevention of Crime Act, 1908, 8 EDW. VII, c. 59. The name "Borstal" was
derived from a village in Kent where the first Borstal institution was located. Find-
ings prerequisite to commitment are (1) conviction on an indictment for an offense
for which the offender may be sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment for a
month or more; (2) offender is not less than 16 nor more than 21 years of age; (3)
by reason of bad habits and criminal tendencies, it is expedient for the offender to be
retained under an instructive and disciplined system. Prevention of Crime Act, 1908,
8 EDW. VII, c. 59, § 1, as amended by Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, 4 &
5 GEo. V, c. 58, § 10.
3. BARMIAN, THE ENGLISH BORSTAL SYSTEi (1934).
4. An exception is the Wayward Minor Act in New York which was passed in
1923. N. Y. CalM. CODE § 913a (McKinney, 1945).
5. The following were members of the Committee: William Draper Lewis,
Director of the Institute, Chairman; John Barker Waite, University of Michigan Law
School, Reporter; Curtis Bok, President Judge, Court of Common Pleas No. 6, Phila-
delphia; E. R. Cass, General Secretary, American Prison Association, New York
City; Sheldon Glueck, Harvard University Law School; Leonard V. Harrison, Di-
rector, Committee on Youth and Justice, Community Service Society, New York City;
Dr. William Healy, Director, Judge Baker Guildance Center, Boston; Edwin R.
Keedy, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Austin H. MaeCormick, Eexecutive
Director, The Osborne Association, New York City; William E. Mikell, University
of Pennsylvania Law School; Thorsten Sellin, Department of Sociology, University
of Pennsylvania; and Joseph N. Ulman, Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, Baltimore.
1
of the offender.6  Herein lies the second difference between the recent
legislation and the earlier juvenile Court legislation. Instead of estab-
lishing special courts to dispose of cases of delinquency as do Juvenile
Court acts, this legislation sets up an administrative body to which the
court must deliver certain classes of offenders.7 By this procedure, the
power to sentence has been largely removed from the courts and vested
in the administrative group.
No attempt has bden made to cover completely all new legislation
in the field of juvenile delinquency enacted in the past few years, nor even
to set out fully all the provisions of the three acts which are principally
the burden of this paper. For the most part this Note is confined to
a discussion of what can happen to the individual offender who comes
under legislation which commits him to an administrative group. It is
primarily concerned with whether this procedure is an improvement over
the system heretofore existing and whether it effectuates desirable pur-
poses of the criminal law in the light of both individual and community
interests.
CALIFORNIA
The Administrative Body: It is significant that California's Youth
Authority Act is found in the Welfare and Institutions Code rather than
in the Penal Code, thus highlighting the trend toward treatment of the
offender and away from punislunent for crime.8 The act provides for
an "Authority" consisting of three members who are appointed by the
Governor from a list of qualified persons.9 The Authority is an adminis-
trative body whose function, broadly stated, is to correct the criminal
tendencies of those offenders committed to its care.
Basis for Commitment: Such commitment is required if the offender
has been convicted of a public offense 10 and is (1) shown to have been
less than twenty-one years of age at the date of his apprehension; (2)
not sentenced to death, life imprisonment, a term of imprisonment less than
90 days, or to pay a fine; (3) not granted probation.11
Term of Commitment: Duration of the commitment is dependent upon
the class of offense committed. For misdemeanors commitment is for
two years, or until the offender reaches age twenty-three, whichever is
later.'2  For felonies, the offender is committed until he reaches age
6. For a good series of articles relative to the Act, see 9 LAW & CoN]t-P. PROB.
579 et seq. (1942).
7. This administrative body is the "Authority" in California, and the "Commis-
sion" in Minnesota and Wisconsin. See CAIF. CODE § 1710 (Deering, 1941 Supp.);
Wis. Laws 1947, c. 546, § 58.64; Minn. Laws 1947, c. 595, § 1, Subd. 2.
8. CALIF. CODE § 1700 et seq. (Deering, 1941 Supp.). Hereafter, reference Will be
by section only.
9. Three persons are appointed to the Authority by the Governor, who selects
two of them from a list furnished him through an advisory panel. Members of this
panel are: The President of the California Conference of Social Work, the President
of the California Probation and Parole Officer's Association, the President of the
State Bar of California, the President of the California Medical Association, and the
President of the Prison Association of California. See §§ 1712, 1713.
10. Defined in CALIF. PENAL CODE § 15 (Deering, 1937). "A crime or public
offense is an act committed or omitted in violation of a law forbidding or commanding
it, and to which is annexed, upon conviction, either of the following punishments: (1)
death; (2) imprisonment; (3) fine; (4) removal from office; (5) disqualification to
hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit in this state."
11. § 1732. Cf. requirements for commitments to the Borstal Institutions outlined
in note 2 supra.
12. § 1770.
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twenty-five. 13 If at that time the Authority feels that he cannot safely
be released, he may be sent-to a state prison under procedure prescribed
in the act, but in any event the control of the Authority ceases, and he
must be retained by another agency, if at all.14 The procedure pre-
scribed is very like a second trial of the case, the offender having a right
to counsel and to process for the summoning of witnesses. Appeals may
be taken in the same manner as from an ordinary criminal trial. 15 Of
course the issue to be determined here is not whether the offender is
guilty of the offense, but whether or not his discharge from control would
be dangerous to the public.' 6
Treatment of the Offender: The Authority's powers over an offender
committed to its jurisdiction are broad enough to permit it to select the
institution in which the particular offenders should be confined, if at all; ' 7
it can grant varying degrees of liberty short of absolute discharge; it can
require them to do certain work or take part in certain activities which
are thought to be conducive to their rehabilitation. 18 The Authority is
given power to establish facilities for examination and study of the per-
sons committed to it.19 Pursuant to the findings at this examination,
treatment is determined. Participation in recreational and educational
activities may be ordered.2 0  Work may be assigned under contracts
which the Authority is authorized to make with various state and federal
agencies.2 1 It is contemplated that the bulk of this work will be out-
doors under the various departments of the California state government
such as forestry, beaches and parks, fish and game, and the like. This
work is not of the "rock pile variety," nor is there a chain gang atmos-
phere, security provisions are to be kept at a minimum consistent with
the nature of that particular group of offenders. The real purpose of the
work, at least theoretically is to inculcate a concept of living and work-
ing with others in a group enterprise. It is designed to divert the in-
dividual's attention from himself, to concentrate it on the objectives of
the group to which he has been assigned, to make the individual con-
scious of his responsibility in a project which resembles in many respects
an ordinary community of normal people.
The Act was designed not only to segregate the offenders from
society as a whole, but also to segregate them from each other accord-
ing to their individual capabilitites and characteristics. Those who'can
be given liberty without danger to society will probably be accorded
freedom. Those who cannot, will be restricted in their liberty only to
the extent that it is absolutely necessary. Thus the individual will have
13. 1771.
14. A further qualification is that the offender must not as yet have served the
maximum sentence allowable by law for the offense committed. § 1780.
15. §§ 1780-1783.
16. § 1780.
17. This power is qualified in that the Authority must first approve such institu-
tions under section 1730(a) and 1738. The act also has a provision that those who are
not committed to the Authority because sentenced to imprisonment for less than ninety
days may not be imprisoned in any place unless such place of detention has been ap-
proved by the Authority. § 1732.4.
18. §§ 1766, 1767 and 1768; CALIF. STAT. 1943, c. 238, § 1767.3.
19. § 1760.
20. § 1768. The idea of a youthful offender being ordered to take part in educa-
tional programs is not new at least so far as other countries are concerned. See, e. g.,
Juvenile Court Act of Germany, Law of February 27, 1923, [1923] (JuGENDGERIcnTs-
GEsETz) REicrrSGESETZBLATr 135, art. 1, § 6. "If the court considers educational meas-
ures sufficient, punishment shall not be imposed."
21. CALIF. STAT. 1943, c. 30, § 1760.5, as amended, CALIF. STAT. 1945, c. 639.
liberty, even if it is conditional and restricted in some ways, and the
training he receives will come in a favorable atmosphere. Supervision
here is not so much directed to the prevention of an escape from the sys-
tem, but to determining so far as possible whether or not socially harm-
ful tendencies in the individual are being eliminated. The flexibility of
the powers given the Authority makes it possible to alter the treatment
in a given case with a minimum of tedious procedure. Those who do
not conform to the treatment or respond to corrective methods will re-
main with the authority for a long period of time, while those whose
socially harmful tendencies seem to have been corrected may be returned
to society under conditional liberty at an early date after commitment.
22
MINNESOTA
The Administrative Body and the Offender: The Minnesota Act,
first introduced in 1944, was finally passed in 1947, and is known as the
Youth Conservation Act.23 The administrative body here is denominated
a Commission, but serves the same function and has the same broad
powers as the California Authority. 24 The Act is manifestly fashioned
after the Uniform and California Acts, but contains provisions for com-
mitment to the Commission which are significantly different. The class
of persons subject to commitment, however, is the same.
25
Term of Commitment: The duration of the Commission's power
over the offender is stated in Subdivision 13 of the Act to be "for the
maximum term provided by law for the crime for which the person was
convicted." In any case, however, the Commission must terminate its
control over an offender when he reaches the age of twenty-five. Ac-
cording to Subdivision 27 of the Act, when the offender reaches twenty-
five years of age and has not previously been discharged from the control
of the Commission, he will be automatically outside the pale of the Com-
mission's jurisdiction and he will remain in whatever institution or con-
dition of parole or probation he happens to be at that time. Thus, if
the Commission considers any offender too dangerous to release on the
day before his twenty-fifth birthday, he may be sent to prison where
he will have to serve the remainder of his term.
26
The contrast between these commitment provisions and those of the
California Act are best illustrated by hypothetical cases. Suppose A is
convicted of burglary when he is twenty years of age, and that the maxi-
mum punishment for burglary is ten years in the state prison. In Cali-
forniahe would be committed to the Authority as a felony offender and
22. During the time the offender is under the control of the Authority he may be
shifted at liberty from one institution to another, placed on parole, have his parole re-
voked, etc., completely at the discretion of the Authority. §§ 1766, 1767.
23. Minn. Laws 1947, c. 595. For a good discussion of the original Act as pro-
posed in 1944, see Proposed Youth Correction Act, 28 MINN. L. REv. 300 (1944).
Hereafter Minnesota Act provisions will be referred to as MINN. AcT, subd. -.
24. MINN. AcT, subd. 2.
25. Compare CALIFORNIA Acr, § 1732, with MINN. AcT, subd. 13. The one dif-
ference is that here the offender must be convicted of a felony or gross misdemeanor,
while in California the conviction had to be for a public offense. The differences in
possible punishment, however, for felonies and gross misdemeanors, on the one hand,
and public offenses, on the other, are negligible. They are merely different methods
of describing the more "serious" crimes.
26. This can be done under the broad powers granted the Commission by sub-
divisions 19 and 20 of the Minnesota Act. According to subdivision 27(3) the confine-
ment of the prisoner would then continue in like manner as though it had been under
sentence of court.
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would be subject to its control only until he should reach twenty-five
years of age. In order for the state to keep A under any further re-
straint the Authority would have to take action as outlined above and
convince the committing court that A should be placed in prison because
it would be dangerous to release him. In Minnesota, A would be com-
mitted for a period of ten years by the committing court. The control
of the Commission would cease when A reached twenty-five years of
age (only five years from the date of commitment), but A's release from
restraint would be an entirely different matter. If he were at that time
in a reformatory, he would remain there; if he were on parole or proba-
tion he would remain there.
Next suppose B is convicted of a misdemeanor, the maximum sen-
tence for which is 120 days in prison. B is, at the time of the conviction,
twenty years old. In California he would be committed to the Authority
under the provisions for misdemeanor offenders and could be retained
under the control of the Authority until he should reach age twenty-
three. Under the Minnesota Act, B would be committed by the court
to the Commission for 120 days, and at the termination of that period,
the control of the Commission would automatically cease.
The difference between these two Acts with regard to duration of
commitments can be explained only by the inability to resolve conflicts
which arise between the old theories and systems of confinement and
criminal law and the new system of control by an administrative agency.27
In Minnesota the punishment is, to a great degree, still meted out to
fit the crime, whereas in California an arbitrary line is drawn between
misdemeanor and felony offenders 28 and the duration of the commitment
based on this distinction alone. It is submitted that the Minnesota Act
will present difficulties from the standpoint of the offender who receives
a sentence which is so short that the rehabilitation planned by the Act
will not have a fair chance of success. It would seem desirable that an,
amendment be adopted to provide for some minimum period of commit-
ment sufficient to achieve the purposes for which the legislation was
passed. The old concept that the punishment must fit the particular
offense is not in keeping with the spirit of this legislation, and may
frustrate the accomplishment of its purposes. On the other hand, if the
crime commited can be said to be symptomatic of the criminal tendencies
of the offender, it should not be entirely disregarded when fixing the
period of treatment which the offender must have. Perhaps the California
Act has provided the necessary compromise between the sentencing pro-
cedures under the criminal codes and a commitment system whereby
the duration of an offender's term would be dependent solely on the dis-
cretion of the administrative agency established by the new legislation.
WISCONSIN
Commitment Procedure and Duration: The Wisconsin Act, entitled
Youth Service Act, was also enacted in 1947, but was first introduced
into the legislature in 1945.29 Requirements for commitment are similar
27. See, generally, as to the old system of imprisonment, IVEs, A HISTORY OF
PENAL METHODS (1914).
28. CALIF. PENAL CODE § 17 (Deering, 1937). "A felony is a crime which is pun-
ishable with death or by imprisonment in the state prison. Every. other crime is a
misdemeanor."
29. Wis. Laws 1947, c. 546. For a discussion of the bill as first presented to the
legislature in 1945, see 18 Wis. STATE BAR Assoc. BULL. 41 (1945). Further refer-
ences will be "Wis. AcT, § -. "
to those in the two foregoing Acts, and the common ancestry is apparent
in the other provisions of the act as well. Commitment takes place under
a procedure which reflects some features of both the California and
Minnesota acts. The trial judge may or may not, in his discretion,
prescribe a maximum term for which the offender is to be committed, but
such commitment in no case is to be for less than one year.30 This pro-
vision provides that every person committed shall have training for at
least a one year period and would overcome the objection to the Minne-
sota Act's permission of shorter commitments. Termination of the con-
trol of the Commission is at the expiration of the maximum period of
sentence provided by law for the offense, unless the court in its order
of commitment shall have prescribed some other period. If the court
has prescribed a maximum period for control, termination of control
comes at the expiration of that term, or one year, whichever is the
greater.3 1 There is also a blanket provision in the act giving the Com-
mission authority to discharge any person from its control who it believes
can be returned safely to society, except that those convicted of a felony
shall not be discharged without the written approval of the court, sooner
than two years after commitment, or prior to the expiration of sentence,
whichever is earlier.32 The only provisions of the Wisconsin Act which
are reminiscent of the "old system" are those which allow the committing
court discretion to determine a maximum term for the confinement of
the offender. If the committing court fails to set a maximum term, the
offender is almost completely under the control of the Commission for
at least the full period prescribed by law for his offense.
Post-Commitment Restraint and Judicial Reziew: In case the Com-
mission decides that discharge of the offender from control would be
dangerous to society it can issue an order directing that this person re-
main under its control beyond the set maximum term and must then
apply to the committing court for a review of that order.33 The issue of
whether discharge of the particular offender would be dangerous to the
public may be determined by a jury if demanded, and the offender may
be heard and represented by counsel.34 The offender can then be re-
committed to the Commission for a five year period, at which time the
procedure may be repeated.3  An appeal from such an order of the court
may be taken in the same manner as the ordinary criminal appeal.
Returning to the hypothetical case of A, who at age twenty is con-
victed of burglary, which carries a maximum penalty of ten years, we
have the following situation. A could be committed to the Commission
by the court and given the maximum sentence of ten years. He could then
be kept under the control of the Commission until he reaches age thirty,
since there is no provision in the Wisconsin Act that provides for manda-
tory relinquishment of control over the offender when he reaches a
certain age. Furthermore, he can be retained under the control of the
Commission for another five year period if the Commission can convince
the court that it is necessary to the public safety. On the other hand, A
could be discharged unconditionally by the Commission after only two years
of control. The Wisconsin Commission's discretionary power to seek an
30. Wis. Acr, §§ 58.72, 58.73.
31. Wis. Acr, § 58.91.
32. Wis. Ac, § 58.88(2). A similar provision is also found in the CAx.ioaRNA
AcT at section 1765 (b), and in the MiNNESOTA Ac at subd. 19 (g).
33. Wis. Ace, § 58.92.
34. Wis. AcT, § 58.93.
35. Wis. AcT, § 58.94.
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extension of its control over an offender for a period longer than that
set by the trial court is far broader than the power vested in either the
California or Minnesota supervisory bodies. In the sense that the Com-
mission may actually institute a new action against the offender after
his full sentence as fixed by the criminal law has been served, its power
is broader than that of any court or prosecuting attorney.
AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM
Opposition to the exercise by an administrative body of the broad
powers inherent in the "new system" was at least a contributing factor
to the failure of New York to enact legislation similar to the three
acts discussed above.36 The usual argument against the exercise of these
powers by a commission opposes "theoretical treatment" supervised by
laymen as contrasted with actual punishment of the offender by order
of the court.3 7 The adherents to that argument contend that the par-
ticular crime committed is still the best criterion for determining the
tendencies of the offender, and should be the basis for determining the
punishment. They consider it unwise and dangerous to make it possible
for those who have committed a serious crime to be set at liberty
shortly thereafter, since it is very possible that they may return to their
old ways and vent their impulses on the community. It is contended
that "ends of justice" are best served by the "normal" machinery of
justice functioning in the criminal courts.
Those antagonistic to the reform legislation, however, ignore the fact
that the evident and admitted shortcomings of the "normal" administra-
tion of the criminal law are overcome by the commission system.
The judge, except in the case of the Juvenile Court judge, frequently
has little or no discretion in sentencing an offender in a particular case.38
This means that under the normal criminal court system, no matter how
dangerous to society the offender might be, if his offense were relatively
slight he would be imprisoned for a short period of time and then would
be released. Even if it were apparent from a sociological case study
36. See 66 REPORT OF TME NEW YORK STATE BAR Assoc. 304 (1943). ". . . I
also feel that the power and authority delegated to a board as provided by the pro-
posed plan is apt to lead to abuses, and frankly speaking, I believe the power and
authority is too great to be placed in the hands of three persons and their subordi-
nates." Was this the feeling that caused the apparent apathy toward the Pennsylvania
Youth Correction Authority Act which was proposed in 1941? The Act, Senate Bill
No. 1084, Session of 1941, was read on June 2, 1941, and again on June 23, 1941, and
was then referred to the Committee on Welfare, Public Assistance and Pensions. 25
PA. LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL 3075 (1941). There was no debate on the floor of the Sen-
ate regarding the matter, and no record is kept of any debates in committee. The rea-
son for its failure to pass is left to speculation.
37. Bogen, Justice in the Juvenile Court, 35 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 249
(1944-45). The argument, while primarily directed at the Juvenile Courts, was actu-
ally intended to extend to all "theoretical treatment" of offenders as opposed to the
punitive methods of the criminal law. The main contention is that if the individual
offender's difficulties are made the basis for determining punishment, then partiality,
prejudice and ignorance will be introduced as a substitute for the processes of the
criminal law. On the broad problem of the theoretical treatment of the juvenile
offender see A. E. JoNEs, JuvEN LE DELINQUENCY AND THE LAW (1945).
38. A recent survey shows that in fifteen states only definite sentences are permit-
ted; in seven states, the court may determine the sentence for some offenses but not
others; in eleven states, the courts have no discretion as to maximum sentences; in six
states the courts may fix a definite or minimum-maximum sentence; in eight states
the courts may mix minimum-maximum sentences, and in only one state does the
court have some, but not final discretion as to what the sentence will be. MacCormick,
Existing Provisions for the Correction of Youthful Offenders, 9 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROB. 588 (1942).
that the offender would probably continue to commit crime after his
period of confinement, he could be held no longer than his sentence
provided. This same individual, under the control of a Commission of
the Wisconsin variety, might be restrained almost indefinitely. On the
other hand, under the criminal court system one convicted of a serious
crime would spend a good many years in prison, regardless of whether
his cure were complete at the end of one year, or still incomplete at the
termination of his sentence. Under the commission system, this man
could be released either unconditionally or conditionally within a rela-
tively short period of time. Of course, the parole system is designed to
serve the same function, but cannot do so because it does not have the
flexibility of the commission system. The parolee is taken from prison
and left at liberty; the offender under the commission system may be
moved to a minimum security road camp for a test period first. Further-
more, the parolee must wait until he is eligible for parole; the offender
under the commission system can be transferred without unravelling the
"red tape" in which traditional parole systems are wrapped. The de-
sirability of this change should be evident. It will do away with the
economic waste resulting from the imprisonment of useful members of
the community, and it will protect the law-abiding members of the com-
munity from those who cannot be taught to conform to their standard
of conduct.
There is, of course, some danger of error in judgment on the part
of the commission. It- is possible that an individual at some time will
be given his liberty too soon, but on the other hand, the judge who
suspends sentence and grants probation is not infallible. Parole board
decisions have not always been beyond reproach. The Commission should
make fewer mistakes than either the judge or tne parole board because it
can conduct a more detailed study of the case and has available to it
considerable scientific and sociological data compiled while the individual
was undergoing treatment. After some years in action, the Commission
will have available statistical data which should serve as a valuable guide
in determining what disposition to make of offenders. Each of the acts
discussed has provision for the compilation of such data.39 A further
safeguard against hasty or ill-considered action by the Commission will
be provided by public opinion and censure of its mistakes. It may
reasonably be assumed that the Commission will decide against release
in dubious cases rather than risk the criticism which will inevitably follow
errors in judgment. It will undoubtedly weigh all factors with particular
care in every case where release is contemplated. On the other hand, there
is some risk that an individual's liberty will be restricted without "legal
cause," but this too will be at a minimum since the legislation provides
for judicial review of all cases where it is decided to keep the individual
longer than originally contemplated. There should be no "legal" basis
for criticism, since the power to take away liberty is still vested in the
judiciary, and the offender is not being deprived of his right to a "day
in court."
Because the legislation under discussion is so recent, it is impossible
to point out authoritatively what its effects have been. On the face of it,
however, it is an important step forward in our attempt to control de-
linquency and to handle the individual youthful offender. It will shed
light on the whole problem of delinquency by its provisions for the compi-
lation of statistics. Through the collection of data by its psychologists,
39. CALIFORNIA Acr, § 1752.5; MINS. AcT, subd. 33; Wis. AcT, § 58.66.
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psychiatrists, and other specialists in the field, it should enable each
offender to have the maximum opportunity for rehabilitation. On the
other hand, it should protect the community from the habitual offender,
once he has definitely been ascertained as such.
By the establishment of an administrative agency, the machinery for
rehabilitation of young offenders has been concentrated in a small group
of individuals who are not guided in their decisions by the narrow con-
fines of a criminal code, but who base their action on the findings of
scientists who have studied the individual offender. The scientific ap-
proach to crime and the criminal is at last being given an opportunity-
albeit slowly and hesitantly-to prove its worth.
J. S. K.
